Maximal solutions in decentralized supervisory control by Overkamp, A.A.F. (Ard) & Schuppen, J.H. (Jan) van
SIAM J. CONTROL OPTIM. 
Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 492··51 l 
© 2000 Society for Industrial and Applied :tviathematics 
MAXIMAL SOLUTIONS IN DECENTRALIZED SUPERVISORY 
CONTROL* 
ARD OVERKAMPt AND .JAN H. VAN SCHUPPEN+ 
Abstract. The decentralized supervisory control problem is to construct for a discrete-event 
system a set of supervisors each observing only part of the system and each controlling only part of 
the events such that the interconnection of the system and the supervisors meets control objectives 
of safety and liveness. Definitions are provided of the concepts of a maximal solution, of a Nash 
equilibrium, and of a strong Nash equilibrium for a set of supervisors with as order relation the 
inclusion relation on the set of closed-loop languages. The main result is that a set of supervisors is 
a maximal solution if and only if it is a strong Nash equilibrium. A procedure to determine a Nash 
equilibrium is described and illustrated by an example. There is no guarantee that the procedure 
halts in finite time. However, in the case that it halts in finite time, then it is proven that a Nash 
equilibrium is obtained. 
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1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to show how the concept of a 
Nash equilibrium can be used to obtain maximal solutions of supervisors for decen-
tralized control of discrete-event systems. 
Decentralized supervisory control problems arise very naturally in protocol design 
problems for computer and communication networks but also occur in transporta-
tion and manufacturing problems. The network may be modeled as a discrete-event 
system. The physical separation between the sender and the receiver implies that 
observations of the operation of the network are available only locally. The problem 
is then to synthesize a set of controllers in a protocol problem ··-one at the sender end 
and one at the receiver end of the communication channel. The interconnection of 
the network with the supervisors has then to meet control objectives of safety and 
liveness according to a specification. 
Decentralized control is a conceptually difficult problem. Results are available 
mainly for decentralized control of linear systems and of stochastic systems (see the 
survey [18]). Fundamental results are partly based on the analogy with game, dy-
namic game, and team problems. The decentralized supervisory control problem was 
formulated by R. Cieslak et al. (see [2]), in which the alternating bit protocol is used 
as an example. The authors presented a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-
istence of a controller for which the closed-loop language equals a specified language. 
A generalization of this result to the closed-loop language was fit between an upper 
and lower bound, and an analysis of the set of supervisors was derived by K. Rudie 
and W. M. Wonham (see [14, 17]). These authors also studied the protocol synthe-
sis problem (see [15, 16]). P. Kozak and W. M. Wonham proposed another solution 
procedure based on projection of the supremal supervisor (see [4]). Recent work on 
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decentralized supervisory control of nondeterministic systems using prioritized syn-
chronization is presented by R. Kumar and M.A. Shayman (see [5]). The synthesis 
procedures proposed so far do not satisfy the need of engineering decentralized control 
problems. The performance of the resulting controllers is in general too conservative. 
The approach of this paper is based on an analogy with dynamic game problems. 
The restriction is imposed to consider a model with only two supervisors. The concept 
of a maximal solution of a pair of supervisors is defined with respect to the inclusion 
relation on the set of languages of the closed-loop system. Because the set of pairs of 
supervisors is a large discrete set, there may be many such pairs. The determination 
of a maximal pair of supervisors is achieved indirectly. The concept of a strong Nash 
equilibrium of a pair of supervisors is introduced based on analogy with game theory. 
It is shown that a pair of supervisors that is a strong Nash equilibrium is also a 
maximal solution and conversely. A procedure is proposed to compute a strong Nash 
equilibrium of a pair of supervisors. The procedure is illustrated with an example. 
A description of the paper by section follows. Section 2 contains a definition 
of a discrete-event system that differs slightly from the case usually considered in 
the literature, the formulation of the decentralized supervisory control problem, and 
the definition of maximal solution and Nash equilibrium. The result, that a pair of 
supervisors that is a strong Nash equilibrium is also a maximal solution and conversely, 
is established in section 3. The procedure for a Nash equilibrium is stated in section 
4. Section 5 contains conclusions. 
The results of this paper were announced in the conference paper [11] and form 
part of the thesis [10, Chap. 6] of the first author. 
2. Problem formulation. 
2.1. Framework. A simple framework will be introduced that allows us to con-
centrate on the decentralized aspects of the control problem. 
Throughout this paper denote the global set of events by :E, the global set of 
controllable events by Ee, the uncontrolled system by G, and the specification by 
E. The discrete-event system will be modeled as a finite state automaton with the 
notation G = (:E, Q, 8, q0 ), with Q the discrete state space, l5 : :E x Q -+ Q the 
transition function, and q0 the initial state. For a string s E E* denote by 8 s;;; :E* the 
set of prefixes of this string. 
DEFINITION 2 .1. A supervisor or discrete-event controller is defined by a triple 
S = (:E(S), Ec(S), l'(S)), 
where 
and Ps is the projection from :E to E(S). 
Define the controlled language of supervisor S with respect to G or, for short, the 
language of S as 
L(S/G) = {s E L(G): \Iva E s,a ~ l'(S,ps(v))}. 
Note that L(S/G) ~ :E*. 
Let C(:Ea) denote the set of all supervisors S with event set E(S) = Ea and 
controllable event set Ec(S) = Ee n Ea. The function "f(S) will be called the control 
law of supervisor S. Note that l'(S, s) is defined for alls E Ps(L(G)). 
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The control law "t(S) maps each traces E Ps (L( G)) onto the set of disabled events. 
In the literature, often the set of enabled events is specified [13]. Both approaches are 
equivalent. 
In the definition above the set of controllable events is taken to be contained 
in the set of events observable by the supervisor. In general it is possible that a 
supervisor can influence events it cannot observe. In [10, Sect. 5.2] it is shown how in 
this situation a control problem can be remodeled such that all controllable events are 
observable. As that reference is not widely available, the approach is briefly sketched. 
The idea is based on flags. Controllable, unobservable events are usually implemented 
with flags. If a flag is set, then the event can execute. If the flag is cleared, then the 
event is disabled. The plant is remodelled such that it includes the events that set 
and clear the flags. These so-called flag events are observable and controllable. In this 
remodeled plant the original events are no longer controllable as they are enabled and 
disabled via the flag events. If the flag events are, via projection, removed from the 
language of the remodeled plant, then the language of the original plant is obtained. 
Attention will be focused on the decentralized aspects of the supervisory control 
problem. Marking, nondeterminism, or failure semantics will not be considered. The 
argument for a simple framework also justifies the restriction to only two supervisors. 
The authors are confident that in the future the results can be extended to more 
general frameworks and more supervisors. 
The basic supervisory control problem needs to be redefined for the new frame-
work. Note that supervisors, as stated in Definition 2.1, can disable only controllable 
events. So they are always complete. It is not necessary to add a completeness 
requirement as is done in [13]. 
DEFINITION 2.2. Consider a discrete-event system and a legal language L(E) C 
L.:*. The basic supervisory control problem {BSCP) is to find a sv.pervisor S, such that 
L(S/G) ~ L(E). 
Ramadge and Wonham showed that there exists a unique ::;upremal solution to this 
control problem. This supremal can be effectively computed [13]. It is characterized 
by a language called the supremal controllable sub language contained in L( G) n L( E). 
As the notion of controllability will not be used any further, we refer the interested 
reader to the given reference for more information. The only aspect of controllability 
that will be used in this chapter is that the supremal controllable language can be 
effectively computed. 
DEFINITION 2.3. Let KT be the suprernal controllable sublanguage contained in 
L(G) nL(E). The supremal supervisor, denoted by ST, is defined by 
(ST )-{ {iTEI:c:sO"EL(G) andSO"~Ki}, ifsEKT, I ,s - r11, 
'IJ otherwise. 
It ·is not difficult to show that L(ST /G) = KT. As ST is supremal it holds for all 
supervisors S which solve the given BSCP, that L(S/G) ~ L(ST /G). 
In this paper it will be assumed that the BSCP is already solved and that the 
suprernal supervisor ST is given. It is sufficient to find a supervisor that implements 
ST, with respect to the implementation relation defined below. Proposition 2.7 shows 
that this is a valid approach. A supervisor implements the supremal supervisor if and 
only if the supervisor solves the BSCP. 
DEFINITION 2.4. Let Sa, Sb be two supervisors such that E(Sa) = I:(Sb)· Super-
visor Sa implements Sb, denoted by Sa i:;;; Sb, if 
1(Sb, s) ~ 1(Sa, s) 'V s E p(L(Sa/G)), 
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where p is the projection on I;(Sa) = I;(Sb). 
Supervisor Sa implements Sb if it disables at least as much as 56, 
LEMMA 2.5. Let Sa, Sb be two supervisors such that I;(Sa) = ~(.'h). 
The proof of the preceding lemma and that of Proposition 2. 7 are simple and nrnv 
be found in [10, Chap. 6). · 
The following example will show why the converse of Lemma 2.5 does not hold. 
Example 2.6. Let G be the system such that L(G) = {c, a}. Define S11 by 
1(Sa,s) = 0and1(Sa,a) = 0. Define Sb by 1(Sb,€) = 0and1(Sa,a) ={a}. Then 
L(Sa/G) = {f, a}= L(Sb/G), but 1(Sb, a) g 1(Sa, a). So Sag S6• D 
In [10, Thm. 2.17] it was shown that in the failure-semantics-based framevvork 
a supervisor solveH the BSCP if and only if it implements the supremal :mpervisor. 
Proposition 2. 7 states the same result for the framework of this paper. BPcause the 
proof is analogous to that of [10, Thm. 2.17], it is omitted. 
PROPOSITION 2. 7. Let the uncontrolled system G, the speci,fi:catiun E. and the 
set of controllable events ~c be g'iven. Let Si be the su.premal supervi1'or of the BSCP. 
'IS E C(I;), s [;;;; sr ~ L(S/G) <:::; L(SI /G) {:=> L(S/C) ~ L(E). 
In the rest of this paper we will consider control problems that place extra con-
straints on the supervisor besides the ones given in the BSCP. Proposition 2. 7 states 
that we can first solve the BSCP to get the supremal supervisor sr. Next ·we can look 
for supervisors that satisfy the extra constraints and that implement 31. In this last 
step we can concentrate on the extra requirement. As we are mainly inkrested in the 
extra requirements imposed by the decentralized nature of the control problem, we 
will assume that the first step is already solved and that the supremal supervisor ST 
is given. 
DEFINITION 2.8. The basic supervisory synthesis problem {BSSP) is to find a 
supervisor S E C (~ ( Sl)) such that S C ST. 
Often in the literature supervisors are defined as languages instead of control 
maps. We choose to use control maps as they allow us to divide the control problem 
into two steps. In the first step the supremal supervisor is synthesized. In this 
step the controllability condition plays an important role. In the second step we can 
concentrate on the decentralized aspect of the control problem. Proposition 2. 7 shows 
that we do not have to consider the controllability condition in this step. If supervisors 
are defined as languages, then also the problem can be divided into two parts. The 
synthesis problem of the second part is then defined as follows: find a supervisor 8 
such that L(S/G) <;;; L(Si /G) and L(S/G) is controllable. It is necessary to check for 
controllability, as L(S/C) <;;; L(ST /G) does not imply that L(S/G) is c:ontrollablt•. So 
in the second step we still have to consider controllability. Using control maps, we can 
forget about controllability in the second step and concentrate on the decentralized 
aspects of the control problem. It is not too difficult to adapt the results of this paper 
to a language-based approach. 
2.2. Decentralized supervisory synthesis problem. Up until nmv we have 
only looked at supervisors that can observe the whole event set and that enable or 
disable all controllable events. Now we will look at the decentralized control problem 
where we have two supervisors, each observing a part of the event set, and each 
controlling only part of the controllable events (see Figure 1). The two supervisors 
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FIG. 1. The decentralized supervisory control problem. 
together have to control G such that the language of the controlled system is contained 
in the language of E. Note that the specification is given for the whole controllable 
system. This is usually referred to as a global specification [14, 17]. If the specification 
can be decomposed into two local specifications, one for each supervisor, then the 
decentralized control problem can be reduced to two independent supervisory control 
problems. In each of these local control problems a single supervisor is synthesized. 
This control problem has already been solved by F. Lin and W. M. Wonham [7]. In 
what follows we will assume that the specification is global and cannot be decomposed 
into local specifications. 
As stated before, we will assume the BSCP is already solved and the supremal 
supervisor 8T is known. By Proposition 2. 7 it is sufficient to find a decentralized 
implementation of 8T to solve the decentralized supervisory control problem. 
First it will be defined how two decentralized supervisors co-operate. An event is 
disabled by the combination of the two supervisors if it is disabled by at least one of 
them. 
DEFINITION 2.9. Let 81 and 82 be two supervisors. The composition of 81 and 
S2 is denoted 81 !\ 82 and defined by 
E(81 !\ 82) = :E1 U E2, 
Ec(81 !\ 82) = :Ec(S1) u Ec(82), 
1'(81!\S2,s)=1'(81, P1(s)) U'}'(S2, P2(s)) 'II s E P1,2(L(G)), 
where P1 denotes the projection on :E(S1), p2 denotes the projection on E(S2), and 
P1,2 denotes the projection on :E(S1 !\ S2). 
PROPOSITION 2.10. 1(81 /\ 82/G) = 1(8i/G) n 1(82/G). 
Proof The reasoning follows from Definition 2.1. 
s E 1(81 /\ 82/G) 
{:::::} s E L(G) 'v'va Es, a 1$ 'Y(S1 !\ S2, P1,2(v)) 
{:::::} s E L(G)'v'va Es, a ljt 'Y(S1,P1(v)), a 1$ 'Y(S2,p2(v)) 
{:::::} s E L(8i/G), s E L(S2/G) 
{:::::} s E L(Si/G) n 1(82/G). 0 
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DEFINITION 2 .11. Consider the discrete-event system specified before and a global 
specification. Let the supremal supervisor ST be given. Let E1 , E2 <;;:; E be two event 
sets such that E1 U E2 = E. The decentralized supervisory synthesis problem (D88P} 
is to find a pair of supervisors (S1, S2) E C(E1) x C(E2) such that 
S1 /\ 82 ~ST. 
In this definition we made two important assumptions. The one is that E1 uE2 = 
E. The other is that, according to the definition of C(Ei), the set of controllable 
events of supervisor Si, Ee,i, is equal to Ei n Ee for i = 1, 2. 
Consider the case where E1 U E2 ~ E. If Ee <;;:; E1 U E2, then we can compute the 
supremal supervisor under partial observation, with observation alphabet E1 u E2. 
See [2, 6] and section [10, Sect. 5.1]. Equivalently to Proposition 2.7, it can be shown 
that a supervisor implements this supremal supervisor if and only if it solves the 
control problem under partial observation. We can assume that this control problem 
is already solved and that th-e supremal supervisor under partial observation is given. 
So this control problem can be reduced to the DSSP. 
If Ee g; E1 U E2, then the control problem can be remodeled in such a way that 
all controllable events are observable. See [10, Sect. 5.2]. 
The other assumption is that Ee,i = E; n Ee, i = 1, 2. That is, the controllable 
events of supervisor Si are observable by S;, and an event that is controllable by ST 
and observable by Si is also controllable by S;. This is the same constraint as given by 
Rudie [14, 17] under which decomposability of the closed-loop language is necessary 
and sufficient for the existence of a decentralized solution. It is argued that in most 
communication problems these constraints are satisfied. Again, as we want to keep 
the model simple, we do not consider systems that fail to satisfy this constraint. The 
authors hope that in the future these constraints can be relaxed. 
2.3. Maximal solutions. Traditionally in discrete-event control, supervisors 
are synthesized that restrict the uncontrolled system as little as possible. A solution is 
considered optimal if the language of the system controlled by this optimal supervisor 
is larger than the languages of all other solutions. 
DEFINITION 2.12. Consider the D88P of Definition 2.11. A pair of supervisors 
(Si, SJ) E C(E1 ) x C(E2) is called an optimal decentralized solution if it is a solution, 
i.e., 
(1) 
(2) 
Recall from [14, 17] the definition of decomposability. A language K <;;:; L( G) is 
called decomposable if 
(3) 
Rudie showed that, under the given assumptions, there exists a decentralized solution, 
(81,82) E C(E1) x C(E2), such that the language of the controlled system, L(S1 /\ 
82/G), is equal to a given language K <;;:; L(G) if and only if K is decomposable. The 
set of decomposable languages is not closed under arbitrary unions. It is therefore 
not guaranteed that this set contains a unique supremal element. This implies that 
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in general the optimal decentralized solution does not exist. There may exist several, 
mutually incomparable, maximal solutions. 
DEFINITION 2.13. Consider the DSSP of Definition 2.11. A pair of supervisors 
(Sp, Si) E C(I: 1) x C(I:2 ) is called a maximal decentralized solution if it is a solution, 
'l.e., 
s0 I\ s0 c sr 1 2 - ) 
and there does not exist a pair (S1, S2) E C(I;i) x C(I;2) such that 
S1 I\ S2 ~ S1 and L(S~ I\ S~ /G) ~ L(S1 I\ S2/G). 
The set of decomposable languages is closed under arbitrary intersections. It 
therefore contains a unique infirnal element. Rudie posed the following control prob-
lem. Given lower bound L(A) ~ I;* and upper bound L( E) ~ I;*, find a pair 
(S1, S2) E C(I:1) x C(I;2), such that 
L(A) ~ L(S1 I\ S2(G) ~ L(E). 
She showed there exists a solution to this control problem if and only if the infimal 
decomposable language containing L(A) is contained in L(E). Although this infimal 
is useful to solve the existence question, it often does not give a satisfactory solution. 
The following example shows that it is in general not trivial to define the lower bound 
L(A). 
Example 2, 14. Consider the alternating bit protocol [14, 17, 19]. This protocol 
achieves the reliable transmission of messages across an unreliable connection. To 
achieve this, the sender attaches to each message an extra bit containing either a 
zero or a one. The protocol can start with either a zero or a one attached to the 
first message. Consequently, the message with either a one or a zero attached is 
disabled initially. If the lower bound allows a zero attached to the first message, 
then the protocol cannot disable this message. It cannot choose the option where a 
one is attached to the first message. The lower bound L(A) should allow for both 
options. Therefore it cannot contain either of the options as this would exclude the 
other option. The only lower bound that allows both options is the empty language. 
Unfortunately the infimal decomposable language derived from the empty language 
does not give a satisfactory solution. See also [10, Sect. 2.5]. 0 
Another suggestion presented in [14, 17] was to look for the suboptimal solution 
characterized by the strong decomposability condition. A language K ~ L( G) is 
called strongly decomposable (with respect to I:1 and I; 2 ) if 
(4) 
This condition is closed under arbitrary unions. So the supremal strongly decompos-
able language exists. Recall from [6] the definition of normality. A language K ~ L( G) 
is called normal (with respect to I:0 ~ L:) if 
(5) K = p.;- 1 (p0 (K)) n L(G). 
Normality of a language K is a sufficient condition for the existence of supervisor that 
can observe events in I:0 and that achieves K as language of the controlled system. 
PROPOSITION 2.15. If K ~ L( G) is strongly decomposable with respect to L;l and 
I;2, then K is normal with respect to I;1 and normal with respect to I;2. 
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Proof. The inclusion K s;::: Pi1(Pi(K)) n L(G) is satisfied for all languages con-
tained in L(G). So, it is sufficient to prove K 2 pj1(pi(K)) nL(G). By the definition 
of strong decomposability 
K = (P1 1 (P1(K)) U P2 1(p2(K))) n L(G) 
= (P1 1 (P1(K)) n L(G)) u (P2 1 (p2(K)) n L(G)) 
~ Pi1(Pi(K)) n L(G) for i = 1, 2. 0 
The consequence of this proposition is that, if language K is strongly decom-
posable, then one supervisor, either 81 E C('E1) or S2 E C('E2), can obtain K as 
language of the controlled system. The other supervisor is not needed. Obviously, 
strong decomposability is too strong a restriction for decentralized control problems. 
It can be concluded that the existing results for decentralized supervisory control 
problems do not satisfy the needs from control engineering. 
In this paper a characterization of maximal solutions for decentralized control 
problems will be derived. Is it useful to look for maximal solutions? If a solution 
is maximal, then this does not imply that it is a good solution. For instance, a 
maximal solution may allow a lot of unimportant traces and disable all important 
ones. Another solution which allows less unimportant traces but more important 
ones may be considered a better solution. However, the authors believe there are 
some good reasons to investigate the characteristics of maximal solutions. The first 
and most important reason is that it gives us valuable insight into the fundamental 
properties of decentralized control problems. This insight may be used to derive 
algorithms that can synthesize "good" (in whatever sense) solutions, whether they 
are maximal or not. 
Another reason why the authors believe maximality is important is that these 
"good" solutions will probably be maximal. So, although maximality of a solution 
does not imply that this solution is useful, a solution that is useful (good in some 
sense) will most likely be maximal. If a characterization of all maximal solutions 
can be given, then all "good" solutions will satisfy this characterization. So this 
characterization limits the class of solutions in which the good ones can be found. 
Suppose a solution is given, but it is not fully satisfactory. One can ask the 
question whether the solution can be extended to obtain a better one. This is possible 
only if the given solution is not yet maximal. So also in this case a characterization 
of the maximal solutions will be useful. 
2.4. Projections. In [4], Kozak and Wonham propose projections of the supre-
mal supervisor as a solution to the decentralized control or synthesis problem. 
DEFINITION 2.16. The projection of the supremal supervisor to event set 'Ea s;::: 
E(ST) is denoted by proj(ST,"Ea)· It is defined for all Sa E Pa(L(G)) by 
f'(proj(S1, 'Ea), Sa) 
= { CT E Ee n 'Ea: :ls E p~1 (sa) n L(ST /G)such that a E !'(ST, s)}. 
PROPOSITION 2.17 ([4], Lem. 5.1). 
(6) proj(ST,'E1)/\proj(S1,'E2) ~ S1. 
Kozak and Wonham call proj(ST, 'E1) /\ proj(ST, 'E2) the fully decentral'ized solu-
tion. In general the infimal decomposable solution of Rudie and the projected solution 
of Kozak and Wonham are incomparable. However, if the given lower bound, L(A), is 
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sr: 
proj(Si,I;1): 
[a1] ;ob1 
proj(Si,E2): 
[a2] /C)b2 
FIG. 2. The fully decentmli.zed solution is in general not maximal. 
the empty trace, then the projected solution is larger than the infimal decomposable 
solution. But, even if 2:; 1 n E2 = 0, the fully decentralized solution is in general not 
maximal. Consider the following example. 
Example 2.18. Consider the supremal supervisor and the fully decentralized 
solution given in Figure 2. In this example E1 = { a1 , bi}, E2 = { a2 , b2}, and 
Ee= {a1,a2}. The pair (proj(ST,I;1),proj(Si,E2)) is not maximal, because the 
pair (S1, S2 ) results in a strictly larger controlled language. 
Supervisor proj(Si, Ei) disables event a 1 because the uncontrolled system can 
execute event a2, after which event a1 must be disabled. However, as supervisor S2 
disables a2 it is not necessary for supervisor S1 to disable a 1 . The pair of supervisors 
obtained by projection from the supremal supervisor is in general not maximal because 
the supervisors only take into account the control actions of the supremal supervisor. 
They do not consider the control law of the other supervisor. In order to obtain a 
maximal solution it is necessary that the supervisors take into account the control 
law of the other supervisor. So, to synthesize supervisor S1 one should already know 
the control law of supervisor S2, and to synthesize S2 one should already know the 
control law of supervisor S1. It is this cyclic dependency that makes the synthesis of 
decentralized controllers such a hard problem. 
3. Nash equilibria and maximal solutions. Decentralized stochastic control 
has been studied extensively. It is related to game and team theory (see [l, 3, 8, 12]). 
In these fields of research a so-called cost function is used. This cost function maps 
a decentralized control law to a real number. A solution is considered optimal if it 
has the lowest co:;t. Using cost functions, all solutions can be compared with each 
other. In the field of decentralized supervisory control, solutions are compared by the 
S I • [a1] 1 . • 
/ 
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So /\ so . [b2] 1 2 . • / 
SI•[] [] 
2 ·,·---___,·-· /' b2 
S 1 /\ S1 • [a1] [at] 
1 2~·---b-2--·-· 
FIG. 3. The pair (SJ', S:l) is a Nash equilibrium, yet it is not maximal. 
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language of the controlled system. This ordering is not complete. Some solutions may 
not be comparable. 
In game and team theory the notion of Nash equilibrium plays an important role. 
It will be shown that Nash equilibria are also important for decentralized supervisory 
control. A pair of supervisors forms a Nash equilibrium if a supervisor cannot improve 
the controlled language when the other supervisor is kept fixed and conversely. 
DEFINITION 3.1. Consider the DSSP of Definition 2.11. A pair of supervisors 
(Sf, 82) E C(E1) x C(E2) is called a Nash equilibrium if it is a solution, i.e., 
and 
sf/\ s~ ~ sr, 
VS2 E C(E2)Sf /\ S2 ~ sT ::::> L(Sf /\ S2/G) ~ L(S~ /\ S~/G), and 
VS1 E C(Ei)S1 /\ s~ ~ s1::::? L(S1 /\ S2fG) ~ L(Sf /\ S~/G). 
In game theory, controllers have conflicting optimization criteria, whereas in team 
theory all controllers try to optimize the same cost criterion. Note that in the above 
definition the closed-loop language is analogous to the cost function in a team or game 
problem. The notion of Nash equilibrium has been introduced in game theory. In 
team theory it is also known as a person-by-person optimal solution. 
In team theory, under certain convexity conditions, a set of controllers is maximal 
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium [12]. This equivalence is quite useful because it 
is relatively easier to determine a Nash equilibrium than a maximum. 
The following example shows that for discrete-event systems the Nash equilibrium 
condition is not sufficient to guarantee maximality. 
Example 3.2. Consider the supremal supervisor sr and the decentralized im-
plementation (Sf ,S2) given in Figure 3. E1 = {ai}, E2 = {b2}. All events are 
controllable. It is not difficult to check that the pair (Sl', S2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
However, it is not maximal, because the pair (S~, S~) is a solution with a strictly 
larger controlled language. D 
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For discrete-event systems we need the stronger condition of a strong Nash equi-
librium to guarantee maximality of a pair of supervisors. 
DEFINITION 3.3. Consider the DSSP of Definition 2.11. A pair of supervisors 
(Sf, 32) E C(2::1) xC(E2) is called a strong Nash equilibrium ·if it is a Nash equilibrium, 
and for all (S1,S2) E C(Ei) x C(E2), 
(7) L(S1 /\ S2/G) = L(Sf /\ S~/G) ==?- (S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
An intuitive interpretation of the need for the concept of a strong Nash equi-
librium follows. The aim of the paper is to obtain a characterization of a maximal 
decentra.lized solution in terms of a person-by-person characterization as in game and 
team theory. Example 3.2 shows that there exists a pair of supervisors that is a 
Nash equilibrium but not a maximal solution. The condition for a pair of supervi-
sors (Sf, S2) to be a Nash equilibrium is phrased solely in terms of the closed-loop 
language L(Sf /\ s:j)G). Because of this formulation, it appears that it is necessary 
that any pair of languages that achieves the same closed-loop language is also a Nash 
equilibrium. If such a pair was not a Nash equilibrium, one would be able to construct 
a pair of supervisors with a strictly larger closed-loop language. This in turn would 
contradict maximality. The next theorem shows that the concept of a strong Nash 
equilibrium is appropriate. 
By Proposition 2.7, L(S1 /\ S2/G) = L(S]' /\ S2/G) and Sf/\ S2 !;;;; ST together 
imply that S1 /\ S2 r;;:; Si. 
THEOREM 3.4. A pair of supervisors (S1, S2) E C(E1) x C(I:2) is maximal if and 
only if it is a strong Nash equilibrium. 
Proof (strong Nash ==?- Maximal). Assume (Sl, S2) E C(E1) x C(E2) is strong 
Nash but not maximal. Then there exists a pair (S1, S2 ) E C(I: 1 ) x C(I:2 ) such that 
S1 /\ S2 r;;:; ST and L(Sf /\ S2fG) ~ L(S1 /\ S2/G). Define sp E C(I:1) by 
1(Sf,s1) = 'Y(Sf,si) U1(S1,s1) Vs1 E P1(L(G)). 
We will prove the following points. 
l. L(Sp /G) = L(S]'/G) n L(Si/G), 
2. sp A s2 r;;:; sr, 
3. Sp /\ S2 r;;:; ST, 
4. L(Sf /\ S2f G) = L(Sp /\ S2f G), 
5. L(Sp /\ S2fG) ~ L(Sp /\ S2fG). 
(Point 1.) This point will be proven by complete induction. The initial step 
follows from c: E L(Sp /G) and c E L(Sl/G) n L(Si/G). For the inductive step let 
s E L(SP/G) and s E L(Sf/G) nL(Si/G). Then 
SO"EL(SP/G) {=} MEL(G),a\t'Y(Sf,p1(s)) 
{=} SO" E L(G), a \t 'Y(Sf,p1(s)), IT rf.1(S1,P1(s)) 
{=} SO" E L(Sf /G), SO" E L(Si/G) 
{=} sO" E L(Sf /G) n L(Si/G). 
It follows that L(Sp /G) = L(S]' /G) n L(Si/G). 
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(Points 2 and 4.) From point 1 and Proposition 2.10, it follows that 
L(SP /\ S2/G) = L(S~/G) n L(S1/G) n L(S~/G) 
= L(Sf /\ S2JG) n L(Si/G) 
= [because L(S~ /\ S~/G) ~ L(S1 /\ S2/G) and 
by Proposition 2.10 L(S1 /\82/G) ~ L(Si/G)] 
L(Sf /\ S2JG). 
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This proves point 4. Point 2 follows from Sf./\ 82 i;:;:; Si and Proposition 2.7. 
(Point 3.) From point 1 and Proposition 2.10, it follows that 
L(SP /\ S2/G) = L(S~ /G) n L(Si/G) n L(S2/G) 
~ L(Sif G) n L(S2/G) = L(S1 /\ S2/G) ~ L(sr /G). 
So, by Proposition 2.7, sp /\ S2 i;:;:; Si. 
(Point 5.) From point 4, it follows that 
L(Sp /\ S?./G) = L(S~ /\ SUG) 
= [because L(S~ /\ S2/G) ~ L(S1 /\ S2/G)] 
L(S~ /\ S~/G) n L(S1 /\ S2/G) 
= L(S~ /G) n L(S2/G) n L(Si/G) n L(S2/G) 
~ L(Sp /G) n L(S2/G) = L(Sf /\ S2/G). 
As the pair (Sf., S2) is strong Nash, it follows from point 4 that ( sp, S2) is Nash. 
So, by point 3 and the definition of Nash, L(Sp /\ S2/G) ~ L(Sp /\ S2f G). Then, from 
points 4 and 5, L(Sf. /\ S2fG) = L(Sp /\ S2/G) = L(Sp /\ S2fG). As (Sf, 82) is strong 
Nash, the pair (Sp, S2) is Nash. So 
But this contradicts our assumption that L(SJ. /\S2) ~ L(S1 /\S2f G). We can conclude 
that if (Sf, S2) is strong Nash, then it is maximal. 
(Maximal =? Strong Nash.) Assume (S1, S2) E C(:E1) x C(E2) is maximal but 
not strong Nash. Then there exists a pair (Sf,S2) E C(E1) x C(E2) such that L(Sf /\ 
S2/G) = L(S1 /\ 82/G) and (Sf, S2) is not Nash. So 
3Sf E C(E1) such that Sf/\ S~ i;:;:; Si and L(Sf' /\ S~/G) ~ L(Sf /\ S~/G) 
or 
38~ E C(E2) such that Sf/\ S~ i;:;:; Si and L(Sf /\ S~ /G) ~ L(Sf /\ S~/G). 
Assume, without loss of generality, that such an Sf exists. Let S~ E C(E2) be defined 
by 
if s2 E P2(L(S2/G)) and s2 E P2(L(Sg /G)), 
if s2 E P2(L(S2/G)) and s2 (j. P2(L(Sg/G)), 
if s2 (j. P2(L(S2/G)) and s2 E P2(L(Sg/G)), 
otherwise. 
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We will prove the following points. 
l. L(Si /C) = L(S~/C) u L(S2 /C), 
2. Si /\Si l;;;; ST, 
3. L(Si /\ S~/G) c:;:; L(Si /\Si /G), 
4. L(Si /\ S2/G) c:;:; L(Si /\Si /G). 
(Point 1.) This point will be proven by complete induction. The initial step 
follows from c E L(Si /C) and c E L(SUC) U L(SUC). For the inductive step let 
s E L(Si /G) and s E L(S~/C) U L(S2 /C). Trace s can be in one of the three sets 
L(S&/C) n L(S2 /G), L(S~/G) - L(S2 /C), or L(S2 /G) - L(SUG). Ifs E L(S~/C) n 
L(S2/C), then 
sCJEL(S~/G) <===:? sCJEL(C)/\CJ~1'(S~,p2(s)) 
<===:? 8CJEL(C) /\ (a~"Y(S~,p2(s))Va~"Y(S~,p2(s))) 
<===:? scr E L(S;/C) V SO' E L(S~ /G) 
<===:? S(J E L(s;;c) u L(S~ /G). 
Ifs E L(S~/C) buts 9! L(S2 /G), then 
SO' E L(S~ /C) {:=:::} s<J E L(C) /\ O' ~ 1(8~, P2(s)) 
{:=:::} s<J E L(C) /\ (}' 9! l'(s;, P2(8)) 
{:=:::} s<J E L(s;;c) 
{:=:::} SO' E L(s;;c) u L(S~ /G). 
A similar reasoning holds ifs E L(S2 /G) but s 9! L(S~/G). Hence, it follows that 
L(Si /G) = L(S&/G) U L(S2 /G). 
(Points 2, 3, and 4.) From point 1 and Proposition 2.10, it follow::; that 
L(s; /\ s~ /G) = L(SUC) n (L(S~/G) u L(S~ /G)) 
= (L(SUC) n L(S;/c)) u (L(S;/G) n L(S~ /G)) 
= L(s; /\ s;;c) u L(s; /\ s~ /G). 
This directly proves points ;3 and 4. Point 2 follows from s; /\ S~ [;;: ST, s; /\ 82 l;;;; Si, 
and Proposition 2.7. 
As (S1,S2) is maximal, so is (Si,S~). Then, by point 3, L(S; /\ S~/G) = 
L(Si /\Sr:} /G). From point 4 it follows that L(S; /\ 5'2 /G) c:;:; L(s; /\ S~/G). But 
this contradicts our assumption that L(S; /\ 5'2 /G) iz L(S; /\ S&/G). Hence it can be 
concluded that if (S1 , 82 ) is maximal, then it is strong Nash. D 
Consider two pairs of supervisors to be control eqn·ivalent if their controlled lan-
guages are equal, or 
Then a pair of Hllpervisors is maximal if and only if all control equivalent pairs are 
Nash equilibria. Let the control <xru'ivalence cla.ss corresponding with the language 
K c:;:; L( C) be the set of pairs for which the controlled language iH equal to K. A 
prefix closed and decomposable language can be considered maximal if and only if all 
pairs iu its corresponding control equivalence class are Nash equilibria. 
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If the event sets :E1 and :E2 are disjoint, then a weaker condition can be found 
to characterize maximal solutions. Define (S\, fhJ as the pair of most restrictive 
supervisors in the control equivalence class of (S1, S2 ). 
DEFINITION 3.5. Let (S1, 82) E C(:E1) x C(:E2). The s'upervisor S1 E C(:E1) is 
defined by 
1(S\,si) = {u E :Ec(S1): s1a tf. P1(L(81 /\ S2/G))} Vs1 E P1(L(G)). 
The supervisor S2 E C (:E2) is defined analogously. 
Supervisor S1 can be seen as the most restrictive supervisor of all supervisors 
Si for which there exists a supervisor S& such that L(Si /\ S&/G) = L(S1 /\ S2 /G). 
That is, if such an Si disables event a after trace s, then SO' is not an element of 
L(SijG) ~ L(Si /\ S~/G) = L(S1 /\ S2/G). So S1 will also disable this event. 
First it needs to be proven that (S1, S2) is a solution and that it is control equiv-
alent with (S1,S2 ). 
PROPOSITION 3.6. Let (S1, S2) E C(:Ei) x C(:E2) be a decentralized solution im-
plementing Si, and let (S\, S2 ) be defined as above. Then 
l. S1 A fh i;;:; Si, and 
2. L(S1 A S2/G) = L(S1 /\ S2/G). 
Proof (point 2, L(S\ /\ S2 /G) ~ 1(81 /\ S2/G)). First we will prove by induction 
that L(Si/G) ~ L(Si/G). Theinitialstepfollowsfromc: E L(Si/G) andt: E L(Si/G). 
For the inductive step lets E L(Si/G) and s E L(Si/G). 
sa E L(Si/G) =?-SO' E L(G) /\ O' tf.1(S1,P1(s)) 
=?- sa E L(G) /\ (u tf. :Ec(S1) V P1(s)u E P1(L(S1/\82/G))) 
=?- [because L(S1 /\ S2/G) ~ L(8i/G)) 
sa E L(G) /\ (u tf. :Ec(S1) V P1(s)u E P1(L(Si/G))) 
=?- sa E L(G) /\ (u tj. :Ec(S1) Vu tf.1(S1,P1(s))) 
=?-[because a tf. :Ec(S1) =?a rf-1(S1,P1(s))) 
sa E L(G) /\ a tf.1(S1,P1(s)) 
=?- sa E L(Si/G). 
By symmetry it follows that L(S2/G) ~ L(S2/G). So 
L(S1 /\ S2/G) = L(Si/G) n L(S2/G) ~ L(Si/G) n L(S2/G) = L(S1 /\ S2/G). 
(Point 2, L(S1 /\ S2 /G) ~ L(S1 /\ S2 /G).) First it will be proven by induction 
that L(S1 A S2 /G) ~ L(Si/G). The initial step follows from c: E 1(~1 /\ S2/G) and 
c E L(S\/G). For the inductive step lets E L(S1 /\ 52/G) and s E L(Si/G). 
sa E L(S1 /\ S2/G) 
=?-a rf- :E1 V (u E :E1 /\ p1(su) = P1(s)a E P1(L(S1 /\ S2/G))) 
=?- [by construction of 1(S1, P1 ( s))) 
a tf. :E1 V (u E :E1 /\a t/.1(S1,P1(s))) 
=?- [because1(S1 ,p 1 (s))~:E1) u5t'1(S1,P1(s)) 
=? [because s E L(Si/G) and SO' E L(G)) SO' E L(Si/G). 
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By symmetry it follows that L(S1 /\ 82/G) ~ L(S2/C). So 
L(S1 /\ 82/G) ~ L(Si/C) n L(S2/C) = L(S1 A S2/G). 
(Point 1.) This follows directly from point 2 and Proposition 2.7. D 
THEOREM 3.7. Let E1 n E2 = 0. Let (81, S2) E C(E1) x C(Ez). Let (S1, S2) E 
C(Ei) x C(E2 ) be defined by Definition 3.5. Then (S1,S2) is maximal if and only if 
(S1, S2) is a Nash equ·ilibrium. 
Proof (Maximal =} Nash). If (S1, 82) is maximal, then by Theorem 3.4 (S1, S2) 
is a strong Nash equilibrium, which by points 1 and 2 of Proposition 3.6 implies that 
(S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
(Nash=} Ma,ximal.) Assume (S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium, but (S1, 82) is not 
maximal. Then, by point 2 of Proposition 3.6 (S1, S2) is not maximal. There exists a 
pair (S(, S~) E C(E1) xC(E2 ) such that s; /\S& \::; Si and L(S1 f\S2/G) ~ L(s; /\S~/G). 
We will first prove that 
81 A s; \::; si and s~ A 82 \::; sr. 
It will be proven by induction that L(Si/G) s:;: L(S;JG). The initial step follows 
from c E L(Si/C) and c E L(S;/C). For the inductive step let s E L(Si/C) and 
s E L(SUC). 
sa E L(S\/G) =} sa E L(C) /\a tf_ 1(S1,p1(s)) 
=? sa E L(C) /\ (O' tf_ Ec(S1) V P1(s)a E P1(L(S1 f\ S2/C))) 
==>[because L(S1 /\ 82/G) ~ L(S~ /\ s;/G) s:;: L(S;/G)] 
sa E L(C) /\ (O' tf. Ec(S1) V P1(s)a E P1(L(SUC))) 
=>saEL(C) /\ (O'tf.Ec(S1)Vatf.1(S~,p1(s))) 
==?[because a tf_ Ec(S1) ==?a tf_ 1(S;,P1(s))] 
sa E L(G) /\ a tf_ 1(8~, P1(s)) 
==> sa E L(S;/c). 
It follows that L(Si/C) s::; L(S;/G). Now 
L(S1 /\ s;;c) = L(Si/C) n L(s;;c) s::; L(SUC) n L(s;;c) 
= L(s; f\ S~/G) s::; L(Si /G). 
So, by Pro_posi~on 2. 7, S1 /\ s~ \::; Si. It follows by symmetry that s; /\ S2 \::; Si. 
As L(S1 /\ S2/G) ~ L(S( /\ SUG) there exists a traces E L(S; f\ S~/G) such that 
8 tf_ L(S1 /\ Sz/G). Let va be the prefix of s such that O' EE, v E L(S1 /\ S2/G), and 
va tf_ L(S1 /\ S2/G). Assume without loss of generality that O' E L:2. Then, by the 
assumption that E1nE2 = 0, a tf. 2:1. So O" tf_ 1(S1,p1(v)) s:;: L: 1 . Thus VO" E L(Si/G). 
As VO' E L(s; /\ SUG) ~ L(S~/C), it follows that VO" E L(S1 /\ S~/G). But this 
contradicts the fact that (S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence we can conclude that 
if (S1, S2) is a Nash equilibrium, then (S1, 82) is maximal. D 
A prefix closed and decomposable language K s:;: L(G) can be considered maximal 
if and only if the pair of most restricting supervisors in the control equivalence class 
corresponding with language K is a Nash equilibrium. 
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4. Construction of Nash equilibria. Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 give characteri-
zations of the maximal solutions in terms of Nash equilibria. However, they do not 
state how Nash equilibria can be obtained. For dynamic games in the field of game 
and team theory, a necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium can be given by the 
coupled Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi equations. A solution to these equations is under 
certain additional conditions also sufficient for a Nash equilibrium. A procedure for 
the construction of a solution is known [9]. It alternately keeps one of the controllers 
fixed and tries to optimize the other. At each iteration only one of the controllers 
is optimized. For dynamic games it is not guaranteed that the procedure converges. 
And if it converges, it is not guaranteed that it does so in a finite number of steps. 
For supervisory control the Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi equations are not applica-
ble. Yet, the procedure can still be used. At each iteration one of the supervisors 
is kept fixed and the other is optimized. Only one supervisor is synthesized in each 
step. This can be seen as a supervisory control problem for a single supervisor. The 
combination of the fixed supervisor and the uncontrolled system is taken as the un-
controlled system for this control problem. As only one supervisor is synthesized (and 
all controllable events are observable) a unique optimal solution exists. In the next 
iteration this optimal supervisor is taken fixed and the other supervisor is optimized. 
This procedure is repeated until the pair of supervisors remains invariant. Below this 
procedure is formalized. 
Assume without loss of generality that S1 is the supervisor which is kept fixed. 
Consider the supervisory control problem with partial observations for the plant Si/G 
and with legal language L(ST). Then define 
(8) K =sup (2) K' controllable with respect to (L(Si/G), 2:c(2:2)), . { 
K' ~ L(Si/G)l(l) K' ~ L(ST), } 
(3) and normal with respect to L(Sif G) and P2 
The supremal supervisor S2 with respect to the uncontrolled system Si/G is defined 
by 
(9) 
If 82 is kept fixed, then S1 is computed analogously. The formula for K in this case 
is obtained from that of (8) by interchanging the indices 1 and 2. 
LEMMA 4.1. Let 81 be the supervisor which is kept fixed. Let S2 and K be as 
defined above. Then L(S1 /\ 82/G) = K. 
Proof The proof will be by complete induction. As c E 1(81 /\ 82/G) and c EK 
the initial step is satisfied. For the inductive step lets E 1(81 /\ S2/G) and s EK. 
Ba' E 1(81 /\ 82/G) ~ SO' E 1(Si/G) /\CJ' f/. '"'1(82, P2(s)) 
~ sO' E 1(8i/G) /\ (CJ' f/. Ec(2:2) V P2(s)O' E P2(K)) 
~ [because s E K and K is controllable] 
SO' E 1(SifG) /\ (sa EK V p2(s)O' E P2(K)) 
~ [because K ~ P2 1(p2(K))] 
SO' E 1(Si/G) /\SO" E P2 1(p2(K)) 
~ [because K is normal with respect toL(Si/G)] 
SO'E K. 0 
The procedure is described by the following steps. 
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PROCEDURE 4.2. 
1. Choose a pair of most restrictive supervisors ( sp, sg) as starting point of 
the procedure. Take, for instance, the pair of most restrictive supervisors 
corresponding with the fully decentralized solution. Let j = 0. 
2. If j is even, then let s4+i be the supremal supervisor with respect to uncon-
. ·+1 . 
trolled system Si/G and event set B2. Let Si = Si. If j is odd, then let 
S{+l be the supremal supervisor with respect to uncontrolled system S4/G and 
"+l . 
event set B1. Let S~ = S~. 
3. If (S{+i, s4+1) # (S{, s4), then increment j and continue with step 2. 
First it will be shown that all pairs of supervisors ( S{, B4) are most restricting. 
LEMMA 4.3. Let j E N and assume that (S{, B4) is most restrictive. Then 
( s{ + 1 ' s4 +1) obtained in the second step of the procedure is also most restrictive. 
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that j is odd. So s4+1 = S4 and 
s{+1 is the supremal supervisor with respect to S4/G. Let KJ = L(S{ /\ B4/G) and 
Ki+ 1 = L(S{+1 /\ s~+ 1 /G). Comparing (9) with Definition 3.5, it is not difficult to 
see that s{+ 1 is most restrictive with respect to KH1. Supervisor s4+ 1 = 84 is most 
restrictive with respect to language KJ. It remains to show that it is most restrictive 
with respect to Ki+1 . 
r; E 1(s4+1, s2) = 1(84, s2) ==? r; E Bc(B4) /\ s2<T r/. L(S4/G) 
==? [because KJ+l s;;: L(S4/G)] O" E :Ec(S4) /\ s20" r/. KJ+1. 
As KH1 is supremal it follows that KJ s;;: Ki+1 . 
O" 'f. 1(8~+ 1 , s2) = 1(8~, s2 ) ==? [because 84 is most restrictive with respect to Kj] 
O' fJ. :Ec(S4) V S20' E Kj 
==? [because Ki s;;: Ki+1) r; 'f. :Ec(S~) V s20" E Ki+1. 
It follows that 84+1 is most restrictive with respect to Ki+ 1 • And thus (S{+l, 34+1) 
is most restrictive. D 
Next it will be shown that if (8{+1, s~+ 1 ) = (8{, S4), then (S{, S4) forms a Nash 
equilibrium. So if :E1 and :E2 are disjoint, then this pair is a maximal solution. 
THEOREM 4.4. Let j E IN and let Sf, 8~, 8{+1 , 84+1 be constructed by the proce-
dure above. If (S{+ 1 , s4+1 ) = (S{, 84), then (S{, S4) forms a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that j is odd. Then, according to the 
second step of the procedure, s4+1 = s~ and 8{+1 is the supremal supervisor with 
respect to 8VG. As s{+1 = S{ it follows that S{ is optimal if s4 is kept fixed. This 
proves the first part of the Nash equilibrium condition. 
From the previous iteration of the procedure it follows that s{ = s{-1 and that s4 
is the supremal supervisor with respect to st1 /G. In the next iteration supervisor 
3~+2 will be synthesized. Supervisor s~+2 is the optimal solution with respect to 
sf+1 /G = 81/G = s{-1 /G. So 84+2 will be equal to S{ Supervisor S~ is optimal if 
S{ is kept fixed. This proves the second part of the Nash equilibrium condition. And 
thus (S{, S4) is a Nash equilibrium. D 
Example 4.5. Consider the system described in Example 2.18 and Figure 2. 
Take the pair of most restrictive supervisors corresponding with the fully decentralized 
solution as starting point of the procedure. In this case sp = proj(Si, :E1) and sg = 
proj(Si,:E2). Let :E1 = {a1,b1}, :E2 = {a2,b2}, and :Ee = {a1 ,a2}. Note that 
G: 
S(). l . 
svc: 
syc: 
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the event sets :E 1 and :E2 are disjoint. The construction of the Nash equilibrium is 
summarized in Figure 4. In this construction use is made of the expression for the 
control law of (9). First sp is kept fixed and the optimal supervisor S~ with respect 
to the uncontrolled system S?/G is derived. Note that L(S?/G) ~ L(ST) and thus 
by (8) K= L(Sf/G). 
Next, SJ is kept fixed. The language L(SVG) g; L(ST), so K is a proper subset of 
L( SJ I G). The optimal supervisor sr with respect to the uncontrolled system sv G is 
derived. It turns out that St = S?. In subsequent steps the pair of supervisors remains 
invariant. The pair (Sf, S~) is thus a Nash equilibrium, and therefore, according to 
Theorem 3. 7, a maximal solution. The closed-loop system according to this Nash 
equilibrium is identical to sp /G. 
Example 4.6. Now, consider a slight alteration of the control problem of Ex-
ample 4.5. Let :Ee = :E and let the rest be unchanged. Take, as before, the pair of 
most restrictive supervisors corresponding with the fully decentralized solution as a 
starting point. In this case also the b-events are disabled. The construction of the 
pair of supervisors is then illustrated in Figure 5. 
The procedure will converge to the limit pair (S;, B:j). However, this solution will 
not be obtained in a finite number of steps. 
The example shows that a small change in the parameters of the problem may 
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FIG. 5. Construction of a Nash equilibrium pair of supervisors for Example 4.6. 
lead to a different solution. It may even cause the procedure to become nonhalting. 
Up until now these particularities are not fully understood. Further research is 
needed to adapt the algorithm such that it always converges in a finite number of steps. 
Also, further research is required to understand the relationship between the initial 
parameters and the eventual solution. For decentralized control of finite-dimensional 
linear systems, there is an example for which the procedure does not stop after a 
finite number of steps and for which a decentralized controller is infinite-dimensional 
(see [18]). For concrete decentralized supervisory control problems a few steps of the 
procedure may yield a useful pair of supervisors. 
It would be ideal if the procedure could produce a representation of all maximal 
solutions. It is not certain whether such a representation is finite. 
5. Conclusions. For decentralized supervisory control a pair of supervisors is 
defined to be a maximal solution if there does not exist another such pair with a 
strictly larger closed-loop language. It has been argued that a maximal solution is of 
interest to control synthesis of decentralized discrete-event systems. The construction 
of a maximal solution is handled by analogy with game and team problems. A pair of 
supervisors is defined to be a Nash equilibrium if, when one supervisor is kept fixed, 
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the other cannot be changed so as to enlarge the closed-loop language and conversely. 
The main result is then that a pair of supervisors is a strong Nash equilibrium if and 
only if it is a maximal solution. 
A procedure is presented for the construction of a strong Nash equilibrium of a 
pair of supervisors. The procedure alternatingly keeps one supervisor fixed and solves 
a supervisory control problem for the other supervisor. The procedure is shown to 
work on an example. Another example establishes that the procedure may not stop 
after any finite number of steps. 
Major open questions are (1) the classification of all maximal solutions for the 
decentralized supervisory control problem, and (2) conditions under which Proce-
dure 4.2 stops after a finite number of steps. Experience should be gained with this 
approach to decentralized supervisory control. 
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